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HEEDLESS GLOBALISM: THE SEC'S ROADMAP TO
ACCOUNTING CONVERGENCE
William W Bratton*
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has introduced a
"Roadmap" that describes a process leading to mandatory use of
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by domestic
issuers by 2014. The SEC justifies this initiative on the grounds that
global standardization yields cost savings and an ultimate gain in
comparability, facilitating the search for global opportunities by U.S.
investors and making US. capital markets more attractive to foreign
issuers. This Article shows that the offered justification is inadequate.
The SEC frames the matter as a choice between two institutional
frameworks for standard setting, holding out high quality sets of
standards, asking which choice reduces frictions in global securities
markets. Global market frictions are not the only stakes on the table.
The two systems, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
and JFRS, hold out materially different accounting treatment and the
diferences matter to domestic reporting companies and domestic
users offinancial statements. GAAP tends to constrain, where IFRS is
flexible. GAAP's constraints reflect normative choices, in particular
preferences for conservatism, verifiability and transparent disclosure
of current period results. It follows that the Roadmap poses a
normative choice. What the SEC presents as an investor-driven
initiative in fact abandons an investor-protective institutional
arrangement of more than three decades' duration and holds out costs
for investors and incidental benefits for corporate managers and
auditing firms. This Article concludes the Roadmap should be
withdrawn and the SEC should return to the point of departure-the
ongoing Financial Accounting Standards Board-International
Accounting Standards Board convergence project.
INTRODUCTION
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) swept the globe'
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. For an account of this, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC's Global Accounting Vision:
A Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Cunningham, SEC's
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even as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) retained
their hold over reporting companies and securities markets in the United
States. However, the globalization trend continues to rise and GAAP's
days could be numbered as well as those of its generator, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), long the backer and protector of GAAP and the
FASB, lately changed course, defecting against them in favor of IFRS
and its generator, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
The road to defection began when the SEC eliminated the requirement
that foreign issuers registered in the U.S. and reporting under IFRS
restate their financials to GAAP.2 The political and economic logic of
globalization took over from there. In 2007, the SEC proposed
extending the reporting option under IFRS to U.S. issuers.3 The SEC
claimed that option would afford competitive advantages to U.S. issuers
with extensive operations abroad.4 However, the commentators pushed
back,5 arguing that the value of global convergence in accounting
standards lies in enhanced comparability across the financials of
different issuers.6 Accordingly, admitting two competing accounting
systems into the domestic market would only retard progress toward the
goal. The SEC responded in 2008 by admitting the policy salience of
comparability and doubling its bet on IFRS: it produced a "Roadmap"
that describes a process leading to mandatory use of IFRS by domestic
issuers beginning in 2014.' The Roadmap bypasses an alternative, more
painstaking route to convergence-a longstanding joint project of the
FASB and the IASB directed to the articulation of a common set of
accounting standards.8
Global Accounting Vision].
2. Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance
With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, Securities Act
Release No. 8879, Exchange Act Release No. 57,026, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4, 2008).
3. Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to Prepare Financial Statements in Accordance
with International Financial Reporting Standards, Securities Act Release No. 8831, Exchange Act
Release No. 56,217, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,600 (Aug. 14, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Concept Release].
4. Id. at 45,602-03.
5. For criticism of this position, see Cunningham, SEC's Global Accounting Vision, supra note
1, at 26-27 (contending that effective competition presupposes full information and that the IASB has a
practice of misrepresenting the contents of IFRS and that widespread adoption of IFRS signals a
national-level preference for comparability over competition).
6. See id. at 27-28.
7. Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance With
International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 8982, Exchange
Act Release No. 58,960, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,816 (proposed Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Roadmap].
8. See IFRS FOUNDATION, A ROADMAP FOR CONVERGENCE BETWEEN IFRSs AND US GAAP-
2006-2008: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FASB AND THE IASB (2006), available
at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/874B63FB-56DB-4B78-B7AF-49BBAI 8C98D9/0/MoU.pdf.
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The SEC's reports respecting these convergence initiatives talk the
globalization talk, extolling the benefits of convergence. They say that
standardization yields cost savings9 and that a single global set of
reporting standards yields an ultimate gain in comparability.' 0 Both of
which facilitate the search for global opportunities by U.S. investors"
and make U.S. capital markets more attractive to foreign issuers.12 But,
as so often is the case with globalization talk, important points are left
out. Two of these points are discussed in this Article.' 3
First, the proposed change is not merely a matter of choosing the
institutional framework for standard setting. The accounting treatments
themselves are at issue, treatments that for the most part concern
domestic reporting companies and domestic users of financial
statements. This may seem obvious. But the Roadmap spends only
three of its 165 pages comparing IFRS to GAAP.14 This Article takes
the occasion to fill-in some missing details, highlighting some normative
implications of a switch to IFRS.
The familiar debate over the relative merits of rules and principles
captures many of the matters at stake in the choice of treatments, which
leads to this Article's second point. The rules versus principles
comparison only has meaning within a specific context, which includes
the compliance environment as well as the political and interest group
alignments surrounding the standard-setter.' 5  These matters tend to be
assumed away in recent globalization discussions. The discussants treat
standard-setter independence as an accomplished fact on both sides of
the Atlantic, an assumption that became widespread after the IASB was
reorganized during the last decade to acquire a governance structure that
closely resembles the FASB's structure.' 6  However, politics does not
retreat so easily. To underscore this point, this Article recounts the three
decade history of the FASB, showing that the FASB maintained its
9. 2007 Concept Release, supra note 3, at 45,604.
10. Id. at 45,606; 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,823.
11. 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,818.
12. Id at 70,824 (asserting that a U.S. dual standard "may create challenges in the U.S. capital
markets").
13. For discussion of additional points, see Cunningham, SEC's Global Accounting Vision, supra
note 1.
14. 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,826-27.
15. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of
"Principles-Based Systems" in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1411 (2007) [hereinafter Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of Principles-Based
Systems].
16. For a discussion of the governance issues and process that led to IASB's reorganization, see
David S. Ruder et al., Creation of World Wide Accounting Standards: Convergence and Independence,
25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 513, 526-54 (2005).
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independence despite opposition from corporate management. As an
independent FASB formulated more standards, management
experienced a steady diminution of its zone of financial reporting
discretion. The FASB won out only because of consistent protection
from the SEC. A switch to IFRS assures no comparable protective
structure.
Ironically, a switch to IFRS would also allow management to reclaim
some of the lost territory while simultaneously enhancing rents collected
by its auditors. Thus the Roadmap sends an implicit political signal:
The interest group alignment that protected the FASB, which was
comprised of the SEC and investors in the financial markets (termed
"users" in accounting contexts), disintegrated. If the SEC chooses
mandated IFRS, destroying or materially impairing the FASB, then audit
firms and corporate issuers (termed "preparers" in accounting contexts)
ultimately will benefit, potentially resulting in negative effects on
domestic investors.
Part I of this Article provides the background information,
specifically describing the FASB-IASB convergence initiative and the
SEC's Roadmap. Part II analyzes the differences in accounting
treatments under GAAP and IFRS, highlighting the two systems'
different normative roots. Part III further describes the context in which
GAAP evolved, showing how interest group politics shaped the FASB's
standard setting. Part IV shows that the Roadmap's shift to the global
framework by itself will not denude accounting's standard-setting of
political salience. Accordingly, it follows that the Roadmap makes its
global projections on an implausible set of assumptions.
I. ALTERNATE ROUTES TO CONVERGENCE
The SEC Roadmap holds out an expressway to global accounting
convergence. A slower road opened in 2002, when the FASB and the
IASB coordinated their operations to develop a "compatible" set of
standards.' 7 Work commenced immediately, but progress slowed. The
FASB and the IASB issued a joint progress report in February 2006,
termed the "Memorandum of Understanding." As updated in 2008,18 it
reports completion of joint standards in only one subject matter area:
business combinations. Projects in nine other areas were reported as
17. See Press Release, FASB and IASB Agree to Work Together Toward Convergence of Global
Accounting Standards (Oct. 29, 2002), available at http://www.fasb.org/news/nrl02902.shtrn.
18. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. & INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., COMPLETING
THE FEBRUARY 2006 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: A PROGRESS REPORT AND TIMETABLE FOR
COMPLETION (2008), available at http://www.fasb.org/intlMOU09-11-08.pdf.
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ongoing with completion projected for most in either 2010 or 2011.'9
These include financial instruments, financial statement presentation,
leases, liabilities and equity distinctions, revenue recognition,
consolidation, de-recognition, fair value measurements, and retiree
benefits. One other topic, intangible assets, has been dropped entirely.
Meanwhile, the 2011 completion target seems more hopeful than
realistic. 20
Whatever the timetable, the FASB-IASB initiative does not
contemplate the emergence of identical standards. "Compatibility"
instead means a reduction of distance between the two separate systems.
Even so, the distance between the two regimes can be expected to shrink
steadily, given an institutionalized working relationship between the two
boards. There also could be synergistic benefits from their continued
coexistence. By hypothesis, two world-class standard-setterss that focus
both unilaterally and collaboratively on the entire range of reporting
issues could, over time, articulate better sets of standards than would a
single agency.
However, long-term prospects for collaborative benefits appeal only
to a patient observer. Unfortunately, patience ran out on Chairman
Christopher Cox. The Roadmap moots exclusive use of IFRS on a
tentative, but rapid timetable. The first key date is 2011, when the SEC
is scheduled to decide whether IFRS will be used exclusively. If the
SEC affirms IFRS exclusivity, the Roadmap projects that that phase will
be completed by 2014 for large filers,21 by 2015 for mid-sized filers, and
by 2016 for small filers.22 The Roadmap notes that the transition will
entail costs, but leaves the matter for later consideration as a factor in the
SEC's yea or nay decision in 2011.23
The Roadmap notes a number of residual problems. One is a general
lack of familiarity with IFRS among American preparers and auditors.24
For this Article's purpose, a more important problem is the institutional
shortcomings at the IASB. Its members are selected by an independent
foundation, the International Accounting Standards Committee
Foundation (IASCF), which consists of constituents and a monitoring
advisory body composed of constituents. Structured in this manner, the
19. Id.
20. A review of the reports on these initiatives posted on the FASB website as of December 2009
does not appear to note any significant recent progress toward completion. See also Letter from Jack T.
Ciesielski, Investors Technical Advisory Comm., to Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec'y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n (Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708.shtml.
21. 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,823.
22. Id. at 70,824.
23. A study has been commissioned from the Office of the Chief Accountant. Id.
24. Id. at 70,822-23.
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IASB is a carbon copy of the FASB except with a larger cast of
characters and geographic distribution requirements. 25  Two points of
distinction between the two organizations remain-money and public
sector oversight.
As to money, the IASB is funded through voluntary contributions by
constituents worldwide, including auditing firms, corporate issuers,
international organizations, central banks, and governments.26
Accordingly, questions arise about its independence. The FASB was
voluntarily funded for most of its history, but it achieved fiscal
independence in 2002 with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX). SOX changed the framework of federal recognition of GAAP,
requiring that a recognized standard-setter be wholly funded by fees
27levied on reporting companies by the federal government. The FASB
duly applied for recognition and became publicly funded upon the
SEC's approval of the application.28
The Roadmap cautions that mandated IFRS will come only "after the
IASC Foundation reaches its goal of securing a stable funding
mechanism" that supports independent operation. 2 9  We are not told
what such a mechanism might look like. Meanwhile, a look at the
budget set out in the IASCF's 2008 Annual Report confirms the
existence of a problem. The IASB's 2009 budget was projected to be
E17 million. 30  Of this, the European Commission (EC) donated the
largest single sum, £4 million. The next tranche of funds came from
twenty-two nationally-based sources, many of them private donors
"coordinated" by governments or securities regulators. Of these, the
U.S. is the largest, producing E2.4 million from a coalition of
uncoordinated private companies. It is followed by Japan at £1.9
million and Germany at fl.2 million, with private but coordinated
money in both cases. The cumulated EC and national contributions did
25. See 2007 Concept Release, supra note 3, at 45,605; Ruder et al., supra note 16, at 519-20;
see also INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. & INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM. FOUND., WHO
WE ARE AND WHAT WE Do (2010), available at http://www.iasplus.con/iascf/whoweare.pdf.
26. See 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,821.
27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 108, 116 Stat. 745, 768-69 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77s (2006)).
28. The IASB does not yet meet the criteria established under the SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§§ 108(b)-109, 116 Stat. 745, 768 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s, 7219 (2006)), for SEC
recognition, because it is not funded by congressionally levied fees. For discussion of other possible
problems under the requirements, see Cunningham, SEC's Global Accounting Vision, supra note 1, at
29-33.
29. 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,821.





not cover the IASB's budget. It made ends meet for 2009 only as the
result of a £5.5 million commitment by the Big Four accounting firms. 3 1
Red flags unfurl accordingly: accounting standards bear critically on the
audit process, and hence, audit firm earnings.
As to public oversight, the IASB also falls short as compared to the
FASB. The FASB's parent, the Financial Accounting Foundation
(FAF), is overseen by the SEC. Indeed, the FASB itself has long
maintained a close working relationship with the SEC's accounting
office.32 The IASCF, in contrast, has operated free of government
oversight, implying a gap in public accountability. Thus, the IASCF has
mooted the formation of an international public sector monitoring group.
The SEC Roadmap, in turn, contemplates that the monitoring group will
be running by the time of its projected switch to IFRS. The IASB's
constitution has been amended to allow for a monitoring board made up
of two representatives from the International Organization of Securities
Commissions and one from each of the European Union, the SEC, the
Japan financial services agency, and the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision. This monitoring board's role is to be determined later. Its
present job description is ambiguous: the board will be "linked" to the
IASCF, will "participate" in IASCF trustee nominations, and will
"advise" the IASCF.33 The SEC promises to evaluate the effectiveness
of this arrangement in the course of its trip down the Roadmap.
Whatever the outcome, the IASB will remain several steps further
removed from government oversight than has been the FASB.
The SEC implicitly acknowledged the Roadmap's shortcomings in a
follow-up report. 34 This announced that the staff of the Office of the
Chief Accountant will be developing a "Work Plan" 35 addressing a
number of unsolved problems, in particular levels of knowledge about
IFRS, gaps in the coverage of IFRS, human capital readiness,
auditability, and comparability.36 The report leaves the 2011 decision
date in place even as it moves back the expected initial implantation date
from 2014 to 2015 or 2016. It also returns the spotlight to the FASB-
31. Id. at 16-18.
32. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
33. See INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM. FOUND., CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION:
REPORT OF THE IASC FOUNDATION TRUSTEES ON PART 1 OF THEIR REVIEW 6-7 (2009), available at
http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/573E48C3-52 I C-449E-985F-9A713 1CDACI 7/0/
ConstitutionReviewPl May09.pdf.
34. Commission Statement in Support of Convergence and Global Accounting Standards,
Securities Act Release No. 9109, Exchange Act Release No. 61,578, 75 Fed. Reg. 9494 (Mar. 2, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/33-9109.pdf.
35. Id. at 9497.
36. Id. at 9497-98.
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IASB convergence project, on the theory that its successful completion
will ameliorate problems with the terms of IFRS." This is a step in the
right direction. But, as this Article indicates, abandoning the Roadmap
entirely remains the better course.
II. COMPARING TREATMENTS UNDER GAAP AND IFRS
The Roadmap's policy framework suffers from a fundamental
shortcoming. The Roadmap contemplates a choice between two "high
quality" standard-setters and two "high quality" systems, viewing the
systems themselves as givens and characterizing them only in the most
general terms. 38 In the Roadmap's thumbnail sketch, IFRS is described
as "not as prescriptive as" GAAP and as holding out "a greater amount
of options" for issuers while providing "a relatively lesser amount of
guidance." 39 The SEC notes that this "greater optionality" could detract
from consistency and comparability, in addition to making litigation and
enforcement outcomes harder to predict. 40 At the same time, the SEC
indicates that relaxed prescription may make it easier for issuers to
account for transactions in accordance with their underlying
economics. 4 1
Thus framed, the choice is one between rules and principles, with the
SEC taking the occasion to advocate principles.42 The Roadmap's
framing pre-ordains the bottom line cost-benefit conclusion: Principles
are better, therefore, IFRS is cost-beneficial for everybody; throw in
additional cost savings from convergence, and the matter can only be
decided in favor of IFRS. Essentially, we are told that the choice
between two complex regulatory regimes can be decided without
reference to their more particular terms.
There must be more to it than that. Some of what is missing is
apparent on the Roadmap's face. It tells us that a principles-based
approach opens up issuer discretion respecting treatments, which
sacrifices comparability across issuers. The Roadmap simultaneously
asserts that convergence enhances comparability. Taking the two points
together, it would seem to follow that the enhancement of international
37. Id. at 9498.
38. See generally 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7.
39. Id. at 70,826.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. For a more detailed discussion of SEC pronouncements articulated under previous SEC
leadership, see Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of Principles-Based Systems, supra
note 15, at 1446-53.
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comparability held out by the Roadmap implies a countervailing
sacrifice of comparability in the domestic context as issuers use
principles to devise more idiosyncratic treatments. The SEC's stated
goal of greater transparency accordingly appears elusive with gains on
the one hand, implying losses on the other.43 The comparability
problem is compounded if we add a point-IFRS in practice is not a
unitary international system, but an international focal point around
which a broad range of national systems converge as national regulators
adopt IFRS with local carve outs. 44
Differences of opinion about treatments continue to matter even
within the world of IFRS. To get a better handle on the stakes from a
U.S. perspective, consider some classic cases where GAAP is famous
for rules while IFRS is known for its principles.45
Consider first accounting for capital leases-long-term leases that
must be booked on the lessee's balance sheet. GAAP uses four defined
criteria, including one by-the-numbers test keyed to the useful life of the
asset under lease, with the criteria determining the treatment.46 IFRS
bids the reporting company to look to the economics of the transaction,
including eight factors to assist its determination without stipulating
results following from their application.47 It bears noting that while
IFRS is indeed more flexible, the GAAP treatment, founded on a list of
factors, does not automatically determine results. American lawyers
would describe both treatments as "standards."
Next, consider accounting consolidation, probably the most often
cited case of GAAP as rules and IFRS as principles. Under both GAAP
and IFRS, when one firm "controls" another, both report on a
43. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Editorial, Beware the Temptation of Global Standards, FIN.
TIMES (London), Sept. 11, 2007, at I1.
44. To see this point in a discussion critical of the Roadmap, see Letter from Kurt N. Schacht,
Managing Director, CFA Inst. Ctr. for Fin. Mkt. Integrity, & Gerald 1. White, Chairman, CFA Inst., to
Florence Harmon, Acting Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 3 (Apr. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-162.pdf.
45. For lists of differences between GAAP and IFRS, see, for ekample, BARRY J. EPSTEIN &
EVA K. JERMAKOWICZ, IFRS 2008: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REPORTING STANDARDS app'x C (2008). Large accounting firms also have compiled booklets
describing treatment differences. E.g., ERNST & YOUNG, US GAAP v. IFRS: THE BASICS (2009),
available at http://www.ey.comfPublication/vwLUAssets/IFRS_v_GAAPbasicsJanO9/$filel
IFRS_v GAAPbasics JanO9.pdf; DELOITTE, IFRSS AND US GAAP: A POCKET COMPARISON (2007),
available at http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0703ifrsusgaap.pdf; DELOITTE, IFRSs IN YOUR POCKET
2008 (2008), available at http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/pocket2008.pdf,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES: A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS AND US GAAP FOR INVESTMENT FUNDS (2007).
46. William W. Bratton & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Treatment Differences and Political
Realities in the GAAP-IFRS Debate, 95 VA. L. REV. 989, 1022 (2009).
47. EPSTEIN & JERMAKOWICZ, supra note 45, at 533-35.
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consolidated basis. 4 8 GAAP defines control with a by-the-numbers test.
Consolidation follows from ownership of 50% plus one share of the
subsidiary's stock, but the inference of control can be rebutted where
control actually is not held or is temporary.49 IFRS begins with a 50%
plus one share test as well, but modifies the zone of control under a
standard that variously looks to other arrangements respecting voting
shares, contractual arrangements, and regulatory contexts. Application
of the standard can cut either way, turning less than 51% ownership into
control or rejecting a finding of control given more than 50%.5o The
rules versus principles distinction is descriptive of the difference. But a
caution about the description of GAAP is necessary-the fifty plus one
presumption is rebuttable under both systems.
IFRS affords reporting companies more elbow room in both of the
above cases, but a dispassionate search for economic truth is not its only
normative motivation. To get a more complete picture of the issues at
stake, compare the treatments for tangible long-lived assets.51 Under
GAAP, they are carried on a cost basis. If the asset's value is impaired,
the impairment results in a charge to current income. Under IFRS, the
asset may be carried at cost or fair value. If the asset's value is
impaired, the loss is dealt with by a balance sheet adjustment only.
Moreover, if the asset's value recovers ex post the impairment, the
balance sheet adjustment can be reversed. Here we see that GAAP can
be motivated by conservatism-the practice of dealing with uncertainty
through asymmetric recognition of losses compared to gains.52 It also
favors verifiable numbers, thereby hewing more closely to traditional
cost accounting and constraining management's "optionality" respecting
balance sheet presentations. IFRS, being more comfortable about
extending management discretion to revalue assets, includes a broader
range of fair value treatments, introducing subjectivity into the
determination of balance sheet amounts. Thus, under GAAP, when a
tangible asset is written down, the write down is permanent, while under
IFRS, tangible asset values can change with exterior shifts in valuation
as management determines.
Note also that in the case of a decline in value, GAAP forces
recognition on the income statement, while IFRS lets the company take
48. Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 46, at 1020.
49. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
No. 94: CONSOLIDATION OF ALL MAJORITY-OWNED SUBSIDIARIES §§ 10, 13 (1987).
50. EPSTEIN & JERMAKOWICZ, supra note 45, at 441-42.
51. Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 46, at 1015.
52. See Sudipta Basu, The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings,
24 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (1997).
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care of the matter with a balance sheet adjustment. This difference also
applies more generally. GAAP is income statement oriented because it
evolved as a system that is responsive to the demands of equity holders
in U.S. financial markets.53 When GAAP requires an event to impact
the income statement, it flags the event for actors valuing the company.
IFRS, with its ties to blockholder governance regimes, favors the
balance sheet, reflecting the greater influence of other constituents,
specifically bank creditors and employees.54
Next, compare the treatments for research and development
expenses.55 Under GAAP, these are expensed in the period incurred and
cash outflows are classified into the operating section of the cash flow
statement. Under IFRS, research and development costs are capitalized;
that is, the company books the costs as an asset and shows them on its
cash flow statement as investment cash flows. A basic policy difference
again is manifest. Under GAAP, conservatism is a motivating principle,
and doubts tend to be resolved by forcing a present deduction on the
income statement. In contrast, IFRS is more liberal and management-
friendly, assuming that research and development results in tangible
economic value and delaying recognition of its costs for an extended
future.
GAAP conservatism can also be seen in revenue recognition.56 When
given a service contract to be performed over multiple reporting periods,
IFRS lets a company recognize all the revenue up-front upon partial
performance. GAAP, taking more seriously the idea that revenues
should be matched to expenses, amortizes these contracts over the
period of service without up-front recognition. Keep in mind that the
IFRS approach bears a more than passing resemblance to the treatment
that Enron Corporation received from FASB's Emerging Issues Task
Force, under which it was permitted to show all gains from its long-term
energy contracts up-front.57  A similar comparison obtains respecting
53. See infra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
54. See Cunningham, SEC's Global Accounting Vision, supra note 1, at 48. There is a parallel,
dark side to this. In the U.S., accounting manipulation generally impacts the income statement, earnings
per share being a key factor in the compensation of the corporate insiders responsible. In block-holder
countries, manipulation tends to impact the balance sheet, payoffs to the insiders responsible stemming
from the allocation of corporate assets. Id. (citing Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, AM. ECON. REV.,
May 2000, at 22; John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Difer,
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y, Summer 2005, at 198); see also Vladimir Atanasov et al., Unbundling and
Measuring Tunneling (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1030529.
55. Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 46, at 1017.
56. Id. at 1012.
57. See Emerging Issues Task Force, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Issue 98-10, Accounting
for Contracts Involved in Energy Trading and Risk Management Activities.
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accounting for pension obligations.ss Under GAAP, unfunded pension
benefit obligations must be shown as liabilities on the balance sheet.
IFRS requires no balance sheet disclosure. Once again conservatism
motivates GAAP, while managers get the benefit of the doubt under
IFRS.
Finally, we turn to inventory accounting,59 an area where GAAP is
the more flexible regime. For cost accounting purposes, one must make
an assumption about the order in which goods are sold. They are either
treated as sold in the direct order of production or acquisition-first-in-
first-out (FIFO)-or as sold in reverse order of production or
acquisition-last-in-first-out (LIFO). Given rising prices, FIFO more
closely reflects economic reality on the balance sheet, listing inventories
close to current values, while LIFO better reflects prevailing economics
on the income statement with a figure for cost of goods sold reflecting
current prices. GAAP permits companies to choose; IFRS, with its
regime of balance sheet primacy, requires FIFO.
What difference does all of this make at the bottom line? Accounting
experts tend to agree that, as an empirical matter, applying GAAP versus
IFRS results in significant bottom line reporting differences. One recent
study shows that the difference between GAAP and IFRS earnings
ranges from minus 84% to plus 14%, with an average of minus 14% for
GAAP issuers, with a range of treatments contributing to the
differences.60
The above comparison and the bottom line empirical results in the
end confirm the SEC's description-GAAP constrains, where IFRS is
58. Bratton & Cunningham, supra note 46, at 1023.
59. Id. at 1014.
60. RISKMETRICs GROUP, THE EARNINGS GAP ACCORDING TO LARGEST ADRS: IFRS vs. US
GAAP 1 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-55.pdf
Disagreement among the experts on the normative policy implications of the data also is
noted. Consider in this regard literature reviews and policy analysis by two committees of the American
Accounting Association, the preeminent academic accounting body in the United States. The two
authors agree that the empirical evidence indicates that significant differences exist in reported
accounting results when applying GAAP and IFRS, including the bottom line balance sheet and income
statement aggregates. Yet, the two draw different conclusions, one encouraging competition among
multiple standards and the other cautioning that moving the U.S. to IFRS is premature. Compare
KARIM JAMAL ET AL., AM. ACCOUNTING ASS'N, A PERSPECTIVE ON THE SEC's PROPOSAL TO ACCEPT
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING
STANDARDS (IFRS) WITHOUT RECONCILIATION TO U.S. GAAP (2007), (finding differences in outcomes
but no evidence of relative superiority and, therefore, concluding that competition among the standards
is optimal policy stance), with PATRICK E. HOPKINS ET AL., AM. ACCOUNTING Ass'N, RESPONSE TO THE
SEC RELEASE: ACCEPTANCE FROM FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PREPARED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS WITHOUT
RECONCILIATION TO U.S. GAAP (2008) (finding material differences in outcomes that are relevant to
investment decisions and therefore concluding that it is premature for the U.S. to adopt IFRS).
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flexible. But some important amplifications and qualifications need to
be added. Accounting theory certainly plays a role here, but differences
of institutional context also matter.
GAAP constraints do not necessarily follow a refractory attachment
to detailed drafting at the FASB. There are values at stake, in particular
conservatism, verifiability, and transparent disclosure of current period
results. Part III's discussion of the FASB's institutional history explains
why the FASB pursued these values.
First, some explanatory background respecting IFRS is necessary.
IFRS is flexible only partly as a matter of normative preference. Its
looseness also follows from the nature of the enterprise. 61 A one-size-
fits-all set of global standards of necessity emerges as a big tent
accommodating a range of national practices. The globe-spanning
flexibility of IFRS also reflects differences in corporate governance
systems and financial market regulation. IFRS's predecessor systems all
developed in small national marketplaces with tight communities of
intermediaries and investor populations largely made up of institutions.
Tight communities can coexist with "light touch" regulation,62 and as
between GAAP and IFRS, the latter is the "light touch" choice.
The differences in surrounding regimes of governance and regulation
are wrought into the accounting systems. As an example, consider the
United Kingdom (U.K.) requirement that, if necessary for the
presentation of a true and fair view of the business, a particular
mandated treatment must be overridden. 63 IFRS's stated preference for
treatments that follow from the economics of the transaction partakes of
the same spirit. Overrides have not been the practice in the U.S., even as
financials must "fairly present" the company's financial position.
Litigation risk is the reason for this,6" not GAAP. Litigation risk is a
property of the U.S. adversary regulatory system, a system that, unlike
that of the U.K., evolved to cope with a dispersed, continent-wide array
of financial institutions and investor clients.
It should also be noted that most of the countries in the IFRS fold
have blockholder governance systems, although the U.K., Australia, and
Israel are exceptions to this general rule. Blockholders, having control
or influence over internal decision-making, suffer diminished problems
61. See James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-Year-Old
SEC, 95 VA. L. REv. 941, 947 (2009).
62. Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition 13 (Georgetown
Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper No. 89, 2008), available at http://scholarship.1aw.georgetown.edu/
fwps_papers/89/.
63. See Cunningham, SEC's Global Accounting Vision, supra note 1, at 41-42.
64. Id. at 42.
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of agency and information asymmetry.6 5  Any question arising under a
discretionary treatment can be answered by direct inquiry. Accounting
principles accordingly matter less than they do, given the separation of
ownership and control that prevails in the U.S.
IFRS, then, follows from institutional and political inputs. GAAP
does as well. Part III offers a more particular description of the
environment in which GAAP evolved, further sharpening the distinction
between the two systems.
III. GAAP's POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The FASB was established in the mid-1970s as the result of an ad hoc
process looking toward the establishment of a viable standard-setter
under private auspices. The American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) took the lead,66 with input from organizations and
individuals representing management and the financial sector.6 ' The
organizers had a high-powered incentive: they wanted a responsive
standard-setter without ceding territory to a federal agency,68 which in
those days was associated with domination by progressive, anti-
corporate types.69
Public legitimacy mattered, so the new standard-setter had to be
independent, public minded, and insulated from political pressure,70 yet
simultaneously responsive to constituent interests. 71  The result was a
board selected by an independent foundation, which is also populated
with constituents, along with a monitoring advisory body, also populated
with constituents.72 As already noted, today's IASB is a carbon copy
65. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the
Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 226
(1999).
66. Ronald King & Gregory Waymire, Accounting Standard-Setting Institutions and the
Governance ofIncomplete Contracts, 9 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 579, 583-86 (1994).
67. ROBERT VAN RIPER, SETTING STANDARDS FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING: FASB AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF A CRITICAL PROCESS 8-9 (1994); Mohamed Elmuttassim Hussein & J.
Edward Ketz, Accounting Standards-Setting in the US.: An Analysis of Power and Social Exchange, 10
J. ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 76 (1991).
68. The federal securities laws directed the SEC to prescribe the form and content of financial
statements. See generally Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1934). For a review of
the legislative history, see Sean M. O'Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants and
Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REv. 741, 789-820 (2004). The
SEC then turned the matter over to the AICPA. VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 7.
69. See VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 9.
70. Id.
71. See ROBERT CHATOV, CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CONTROL?
232-39 (1975).
72. VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 13-18.
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except with a larger cast of characters and geographic distribution
requirements.73
A. Objections on the Right and the Left
The FASB's governance model, now replicated at the IASB, pursues
a middle ground that has aroused political objections from the right and
the left. From the right, public choice commentators denounced the
arrangements surrounding the FASB as a rent-seeking scam. From this
point of view, the FASB should have operated as a private standard-
setter subject to free competition. It, instead, has worked as a cog in the
larger machine of the federal disclosure system, the mandates of which
yield rents to auditing firms.74 Following the Roadmap to substitute the
IASB only makes matters worse, taking an unsatisfactory domestic
arrangement and embedding it on a global basis. A prediction follows:
The big auditing firms should count among the Roadmap's strong
supporters.
A second set of critics attacked from the progressive, pluralist left.
For them, choices of accounting principles have significant allocative
consequences; therefore, accounting standard setting is a high stakes
game in which the setter has no alternative but to balance interests. 75
Because the setter resolves political rather than technical issues, its
legitimacy depends on political responsiveness.76 At its inception, the
FASB could not provide this because it depended on contributions from
the preparers and auditors, groups with high stakes in all of its
outcomes. 77 The critics contended that the standard-setter should be an
agency directly responsible to Congress.78 Substituting the IASB only
makes things worse from this point of view because it removes political
subject matter to a distant venue in which U.S. domestic concerns
occupy, at best, a secondary place on the agenda 79 and scraps a publicly-
funded standardsetter for one beholden to private interests.
73. See 2007 Concept Release, supra note 3, at 45,605; Ruder et al., supra note 16, at 519-20;
see also INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. & INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM. FOUND., WHO
WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO, supra note 25.
74. See Ross L. Watts & Jerold A. Zimmerman, The Demand for and Supply of Accounting
Theories: The Market for Excuses, 54 ACCT. REV. 273, 275-81 (1979).
75. See VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 73-74.
76. See id. at 22-23.
77. See id. at 14; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON REPS., ACCOUNTING & MANAGEMENT, S. COMM. ON
GOV'T OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., THE ACCOUNTING ESTABLISHMENT: A STAFF STUDY 1-2 (Comm.
Print 1976).
78. See VAN RIPER, supra note 67 at 45.
79. The 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,827, recognizes that substitution of IFRS for GAAP
implies diminished influence for U.S. interests.
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The public choice critique has never had much political traction. In
contrast, the progressive attack had an impact in the FASB's early years
and prompted process reforms that strengthened the FASB's public bona
fides, particularly in a trend toward ever-increasing distance from the
AICPA.80 This critique also has lost salience in recent years, but largely
because the FASB, over time, managed to reshape itself to meet the
criticisms.
The SEC Roadmap recognizes that accountability concerns retain
validity with regard to the IASB. As we have seen, the SEC wants the
IASCF to get a new monitoring board, and the IASCF has invented one.
But one wonders how well the new oversight setup will serve to meet
the public accountability objection. It imports public accountability, but
to a diverse internationally distributed oversight panel possessing
advisory input without veto authority. Funding may be a bigger
problem still. As we also have seen, the FASB has secure funding,
thanks to SOX, while the IASB still relies on contributors-32% of its
2009 budget came from the Big Four auditing firms.
Thus, to the extent public accountability matters, a switch to IFRS
represents a step backward. The move is doubly disconcerting in view
of the FASB's history. Credible and independent private standard-
setters do not just pop out of technocratic jack-in-the-boxes. The FASB
spent the better part of thirty years pursing full dress public legitimacy-
it formulated, reformulated, tweaked, and re-tweaked itself, and finally,
with SOX it was able to get its ducks in a row. The Roadmap would
throw away history's lessons in favor of an institution at an earlier,
ambiguous stage of evolution. If there were no alterative path to cost
savings from convergence, this might loom large as an objection. But,
as we have seen, a path exists.
B. The FASB and the Management Interest
The political plot thickens with regard to the history the FASB's
relations with its most consistent, most vocal adversaries-corporate
managers.
Management, although a major player at the table at the FASB's
inception, quickly became an adversary. The FASB crossed
management when it undertook its initial project to articulate generally
accepted goals of accounting. The project, which came to be called the
Conceptual Framework, is a set of principles much derided for its high
80. See VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 14-15, 46-47, 86-87, 126.
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level of generality.8' But the Conceptual Framework did provide at
least one outcome determinative point, 82 which lies in a single
unprepossessing sentence in Statement of Financial Accounting
Concepts No. 1: "Financial reporting should provide information that is
useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in
making rational investment, credit, and similar decisions."83 This is
called decision usefulness, and it seems to state the obvious, but in the
1970s this was a radical proposition.84
Financial reporting serves two purposes: it imports external
transparency and it serves as part of a rational system of internal
management.85  Three decades ago, the prevailing concept of purpose,
called "stewardship," encompassed both.86 It meant that corporate
managers had a place at the table with market actors as important users
of the standards. Indeed, they claimed primacy. 87
When the FASB elevated the status of outside users of financials with
decision usefulness,88 it broke with history and defected against
management. It thereby succeeded in protecting its own independence,
avoiding the pluralist alternative of regulation as mediation in a world of
multiple constituents with varied and conflicting preferences.89
Decision usefulness also imported policy legitimacy, implying a one-
size-fits-all theoretical justification for the enterprise as a whole. Back
in the 1970s, management was peddling national competitiveness and
public welfare to argue for a cost-benefit burden of proof to be met by
every new accounting standard,90 an argument that eventually would
register in Congress with respect to SEC rulemaking 9' and still registers
81. See Stephen A. Zeff, A Perspective on the US. Public/Private-Sector Approach to the
Regulation ofFinancial Reporting, ACCT. HORIZONS, Mar. 1995, at 52, 60; VAN RIPER, supra note 67,
at 80.
82. See John C. Burton, A Commentary on the Reflections of Homer Kripke, 4 J. ACCT.
AUDITING & FIN. 79, 80 (1989).
83. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., Statement of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 1:
Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises § 34 (1978), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/conl.pdf [hereafter FASB, SFAC No. 1].
84. See VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 20.
85. See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 74, at 296-97.
86. Id. at 296.
87. See VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 21.
88. See FASB, SFAC No. 1, supra note 83, §§ 27, 32.
89. See Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy, 63 ACCT.
REV. 1, 2, 13 (1988).
90. See R. K. MAUTZ & WILLIAM G. MAY, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN A COMPETITIVE
EcoNoMY: CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 1-4 (1978)
(presenting a project of the Financial Executives Research Foundation).
91. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, § 106(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b)
(2006).
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in today's convergence discussions. The Conceptual Framework's focus
on markets let the FASB argue first, that information is a public good
that will be underprovided absent regulation, 92 and second, that
standards directed to user utility reduce the social costs of information
asymmetry, which include high transaction costs and thin capital
markets with low liquidity. 93
Decision usefulness also aligned the FASB's goals with that of its
governmental overseer, the SEC, and the SEC's goal of investor
protection. 94  The two agencies maintained a cooperative relationship
that has worked well. The SEC's recent defection against the FASB
also amounts to a defection from decision usefulness. A shift to IFRS,
with its constituency-responsive stress on balance sheet treatments and
de-emphasis of income statement responsiveness, would amount to a
retreat in the direction of stewardship.
Meanwhile, management has never been entirely happy with GAAP.
As the FASB has independently set its own agenda, management has
seen a classic case of an unresponsive regulatory agency promulgating
regulations for their own sake. 95 Management also complains of excess
complexity, but not when it likes the bottom line result.96 Management
voices use the FASB's notice and comment and advisory processes to
object, but only get occasional concessions as the FASB keeps cranking
out standards it would just as soon do without. 97
The managers call the result "standards overload."98 Back in the
1980s, their representatives recommended an organizational overhaul to
address the problem. This would have shifted agenda control at the
FASB to a new oversight board with power to block agenda items and
force revision of existing standards. 99 Such drastic reform proposals
have never gone anywhere, even as management has scored occasional
victories in its long battle with the FASB. It has used its political
muscle to block proposed standards. It also secured two seats on the
FASB, and for a while, had a super majority voting regime that made it
92. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 2:
QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION § 135 (1980), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con2.pdf [hereinafter FASB, SFAC No. 2]; Lev, supra note 89, at 8-9.
93. Lev, supra note 89, at 4-9.
94. See VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 141.
95. See Dennis R. Beresford, How Should the FASB Be Judged?, ACCT. HORIZONS, June 1995,
at 56, 57.
96. Id. at 60; VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 110.
97. Beresford, supra note 95, at 59; VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 98-99, 118-31, 183.
98. VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 137; Beresford, supra note 95, at 60.
99. Beresford, supra note 95, at 57; VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 119-23.
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harder for the FASB to adopt new standards.'00
Meanwhile, management's complaint of excess complexity collapses
into the more serious complaint that the FASB drafts too many rules,
seeking to supply a clear answer to every possible situation, pursuing the
objective with detailed statements, bright-line tests, and multiple
exceptions.' 0' This complaint returns us to the Roadmap's justification
for doing away with the FASB altogether and so bears importantly on
the present discussion.
There is no question that GAAP's layers of rules can have perverse
effects. Internal inconsistency can result.102  Comparability also can
suffer as reporting entities under the same strict standard can appear
comparable on the faces of their financials when their arrangements in
fact are dissimilar. 0 3  Worse is the resulting dysfunctional, check-the-
box approach to compliance that admits transaction structuring and other
strategic behavior, along with rule compliant statements that do not
fairly state the reporting company's results or financial position.1 04
Actors at the FASB reply that the rules follow from demands
generated by managers and auditors looking for treatment exceptions,
scope exceptions, and "roadmaps" that hold out "guidance." 05  It
apologizes, but it is just being a responsive regulator and does not
exercise total control over outcomes.106  However, this posture of
accommodation also has a dark side, for it is here that the public choice
critique registers with full force. The securities laws' requirement of an
independent audit makes the large audit firms providers of a necessary
service, positioning them to collect rents.107 The critics allege that
complex, rules-based standards aid and abet the rent seeking, generating
work'08 and over time strengthening entry barriers.109  Moreover,
100. VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 126, 150, 154.
101. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT & OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. SEC. & ExCH.
COMM'N, STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(D) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE
ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCIPLEs-BASED
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM § I.C (2003).
102. Id. § 1.G.
103. Id
104. Id.; Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, ACCT. HORIZONS, Mar.
2003, at 61, 68.
105. See VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 105.
106. See Lawrence W. Smith, The FASB's Efforts Toward Simplification, FASB REP., Feb. 28,
2005, at 2, 3-4.
107. See George J. Bentson, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting Before and
After Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325, 1329-31 (2003).
108. See Charles R. Plott & Shyam Sunder, A Synthesis, 19 J. AcCT. RES. 227, 231 (1981).
109. See Dale Buckmaster et al., Measuring Lobbying Influence Using the Financial Accounting
Standards Board Public Record, 20 J. ECON. & SOC. MEASUREMENT 331, 340 (1994).
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innovations get choked off to the extent that they decrease auditability
and expose the audit firms to legal risk.o"0
All of this is true, but, given the pressures that have come to bear on
the FASB, it is difficult to imagine a different evolutionary course for
GAAP. In effect, the FASB has had to take our second-best world as it
finds it. It is a nasty place where incentive problems impair the auditor-
client relationship, auditability matters, and the standard-setter has to
worry about scandal prevention."' Rules, although not ideal, have
advantages because they provide a base of common assumptions and
knowledge for preparers, auditors, and users. They decrease differences
in measurement; they make noncompliance more evident. And, as room
for differences in judgment narrows, transparency and comparability are
enhanced.11 2 GAAP has followed from defensible trade-offs.
In summary, the FASB put itself on history's winning side with
decision usefulness, overcoming management resistance along the
way.1 13 It thereby aligned itself not only with the SEC but also with the
broader economic shift away from "managerialism" toward capital
market governance under the shareholder value norm.114  The story of
GAAP's evolution is thus a story about standard setting in the U.S.
markets, where separated ownership and control predominates while
tensions between managers and shareholders are exhaustively worked
out in regulation and litigation. The FASB opted for conservatism,
verifiability, and rules because it operates in this environment, not
because of a theoretical commitment to a dysfunctional approach to
standard setting. The IASB, with its shorter history and different
regulatory context, has pursued different values. Accordingly, it is not
enough to describe the IASB as "independent" and its standards as "high
quality" to end the convergence discussion in its favor.
110. See George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 813, 817
(2003).
111. See William W. Bratton, Rules, Principles, and the Accounting Crisis in the United States, 5
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REv. 7, 14-18 (2004) (describing advantages of rules in the auditing context).
112. See Schipper, supra note 104, at 68.
113. For further discussion, see William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A
New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5 (2007).
114. Interestingly, a recent report on accounting from an SEC advisory committee recommends
additional user representation on the FAF. See ADVISORY COMM. ON IMPROVEMENTS TO FIN.
REPORTING, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
IMPROVEMENTS TO FINANCIAL REPORTING TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 4 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/aboutloffices/oca/acifr/acifr-finalreport.pdf
[hereafter ACIFR REPORT]. The recommendation is understandable, but hardly pressing in light of the
FASB's commitment to decision usefulness.
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IV. POLITICS GOING FORWARD
The politics of accounting had a stable equilibrium in the U.S. for
three decades. On one side stood the SEC, the FASB, market
intermediaries," 5  and the users, jointly backing decision usefulness.
These interests dominated. Management stood on the other side,
pushing back as it looked for a larger zone of reporting discretion. The
big audit firms stood between them, looking for standards that enhanced
their rents and diminished the threat of litigation. The standards
themselves reflected the interests thus aligned.
The Roadmap disrupts this equilibrium. GAAP has come to be seen
as one of the deadweight domestic regulatory costs that make U.S.
capital markets unattractive to foreign issuers. Thus has the SEC,
looking to lighten its touch, abandoned a standard-setter that it had long
protected, citing the capital market interests in so doing. But the SEC, at
the same time, severs connections to the capital market interests that
aligned to favor decision usefulness. The SEC's comparability
justification looks only to a subset of capital market users-those
investing in the global context-without asking whether U.S. users as a
whole will benefit from the shift.
A question arises respecting the various interest groups' reactions to
the Roadmap. These can be accessed through the comment letters in the
SEC file. The letters underscore the foregoing analysis. The audit firms
are in favor, and the capital market users are against. Interestingly, the
managers are split.
A. Audit Firms
The Big Four audit firms voice the strongest support.116 They want a
115. See VAN RIPER, supra note 67, at 98.
116. See Letter from PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-218.pdf;
Letter from KPMG LLP to Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 16,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-114.pdf; Letter from Deloitte &
Touche LLP to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-87.pdf; Letter from Ernst & Young LLP to Elizabeth
Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (March 4, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-27-08/s72708-59.pdf; see also ADVISORY COMM. ON THE AUDITING PROFESSION, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINAL REPORT (2008) at C.3-C.4 (remarks of U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson connecting globalization and international financial reporting standards with legal burdens
auditors face) & VII.23-VI.32 (reviewing disagreement among Committee members on wide range of
litigation defenses and legal protections that auditing firms sought in comprehensive review of issues
facing the profession, including effects of globalization and movement towards international financial
reporting standards), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ offices/domestic-finance/acap/docs/final-
report.pdf.
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date certain for the switch, and perhaps more importantly, a redirection
of the FASB's efforts pending the date certain. Resources, they say,
should go into moving along key topics in the convergence process and
new standard setting should cease." 7 The switch, moreover, should be
all-encompassing. IFRS should be accepted as authoritative as it is
promulgated by the IASB and carve outs that differentiate national
systems should be avoided." 8  There is also some push back, but this
goes to litigation concerns. IFRS means greater reliance on principles
and some "may use hindsight and preferences to unnecessarily challenge
and overturn reasonable professional judgments of preparers and
auditors.""'9 The auditors follow up with the classic move of putting the
burden on the regulator: the SEC, they say, should make a policy
statement describing the factors it brings to bear in articulating the
reasonableness of a judgment.' 20
Interestingly, the Big Four appear ready to go ahead with IFRS
whether they get the policy statement from the SEC. By implication,
forced to choose between GAAP and IFRS without a change in the
litigation environment, they will take their chances with IFRS. Why
should this be? Three reasons can be suggested. First, Roadmap
implementation means switching costs at every U.S. issuer, costs that
translate into rents for auditors. Second, as between a financially
independent standard-setter and a standard-setter beholden to the audit
firms for funding, the audit firms prefer the latter. Third, the FASB's
rules have had their intended effect. They make violations easier to
observe and verify, which heightens the litigation risk. Principles open
up a zone in which treatments follow from business judgments, making
violations harder and more expensive to prove. An important point
follows: rules are thought to be the tools of corporate insiders who know
how to game them. That is true in some contexts, but principles can
likewise be gamed. The auditors' enthusiasm for IFRS should make
people suspicious.
B. Users
To see such suspicions in the Roadmap comment file, one only needs
to look at users' letters, which register strong, policy-based resistance.
117. Letter from PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 116, at 8.
118. Letter from Ernst & Young LLP to Elizabeth Murphy, supra note 116, at 7.
119. Letter from Deloitte & Touche LLP to Elizabeth Murphy, supra note 116, at 5.
120. Id.; Letter from KPMG LLP to Florence E. Harmon, supra note 116, at I1. Here the SEC set
itself up. The auditors cite the ACIFR REPORT, supra note 114, which made this suggestion.
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The Council of Institutional Investors lays this out.121 The Council,
before it will endorse IFRS, wants to see, inter alia: (1) the same quality
information coming from IFRS as from GAAP; (2) equally good
application by issuers and enforcement by regulators; (3) sufficient
resources at the IASB and full-time commitments from its members; (4)
a clear cut commitment to decision usefulness at the IASB; and (5) a
governance structure at the IASB that guarantees insulation from
interference by governmental actors.122  Looking at the Roadmap, the
Council finds none of these guarantees forthcoming.123  The financial
analysts concur. They want a roadmap with milestones shaped by
investor concerns and think the FASB-IASB convergence project
suffices for this purpose. 124  The Standard & Poors letter provides
another example of the users' concerns. As a large credit rating agency;
Standard & Poors spends as much time reviewing financial statements as
any organization in the world. It agrees with the other user critics,
noting that principles-based standards are fine in theory, but make sense
for a heavy user only if the system incorporates additional disclosure
requirements that enable the user to look through to the particular
application decision. 125 Nothing in IFRS or in the Roadmap assures this
information.
C. Preparers
The Roadmap poses a cost-benefit tradeoff for the preparers and their
managers. The cost is the near-term out-of-pocket cost of making the
switch. The benefit is the longer-term advantage of shifting to a more
flexible standard-setter. It should be noted that the benefit does not lie
in an expectation that U.S. management can dominate the IASB where it
121. See also Letter from Christianna Wood & Louis F. Moret, Co-Chairs, Accounting &
Auditing Practices Comm., Int'l Corporate Governance Network, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr, 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-
221.pdf; Letter from Mary Hartman Morris, Investment Officer, Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-226.pdf; Letter from Jack T. Ciesielski, Investors
Technical Advisory Comm., Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., to Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec'y, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-
32.pdf.
122. Letter from Jeff Mahoney, General Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to Florence E.
Harmon, Acting Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 2 (Apr. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-194.pdf.
123. Id. at 1-2.
124. See Letter from Kurt N. Schacht & Gerald 1. White to Florence Harmon, supra note 44, at 3.
125. Exactly so. See Letter from Neri Bukspan et al., Standard & Poor's Ratings Servs., to
Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 3 (Apr. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-172.pdf.
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has failed to dominate the FASB. The IASB also has a reputation for
independence.126  Moreover, given its broader, global roster of
constituents, any particular demands emanating from a single national
interest group or regulator are bound to resound less forcefully than they
would in a domestic standard setting context. The advantage for
management lies in the "elbow room" imported by a shift to a shorter,
less directive stack of standards. A shift to IFRS ameliorates the
problem of "standards overload" in one swoop. Indeed, given one
global standard-setter and national governments and interest groups
worldwide, it might prove quite difficult for the IASB to establish new
standards, ameliorating the "overload" going forward.
The corporate issuers' comment letters can be sorted in accordance
with their reactions to the cost-benefit question. Most resist the
Roadmap on out-of-pocket cost grounds, asking why they should be
asked to spend millions on switching in a time of economic stress and
noting that the FASB-IASB coordination process holds out a less costly
route to convergence.127  Others, particularly large multinationals with
subsidiaries that report under IFRS, are more welcoming 28 but would
like additional time to accomplish the switch. Still, others worry about
particular treatments, with the IFRS restriction to FIFO inventory
accounting being a particular contentious issue in certain industries.129
Significantly, many mention the importance of assuring an "appropriate"
level of U.S. input into IFRS.1 30 Apparently, the IASCF's requirement
126. It famously held its ground against the French banks and their government on fair value
treatment on macro-hedging. See Ruder et al., supra note 16, at 579-86. More recently, however,
IASB's reputation became tarnished when it relented to European Union pressure to match U.S.
adjustments respecting market to market accounting of distressed debt securities in bank portfolios. See,
e.g., Phillip Inman, UK Accounting Watchdog Threatens to Quit Over EU Rule Change, GUARDIAN
(London), Nov. 12, 2008, at 26 (describing the resultant threat to resign of Sir David Tweedie, IASB's
chairman).
127. For a bristling enumeration of unaddressed cost concerns, see Letter from Richard H.
Murray, Chairman, Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Elizabeth
Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-27-08/s72708-184.pdf.
128. See, e.g., Letter from Robert Traficanti, Vice President & Deputy Controller, Citigroup Inc.,
to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n I (Apr. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-08/s72708-157.pdf.
129. For a summary of corporate responses, see Letter from Paul J. Cienki, Chairman, Corporate
Roundtable on Int'l Fin. Reporting, & Matthew M. Miller, Executive Dir., Corporate Roundtable on
Int'l Fin. Reporting, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 20, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/commnents/s7-27-08/s72708-202.pdf. The writers represent an ad hoc
group of seventy-five senior financial executives from thirty U.S. companies, organized to channel
reactions to IFRS.
130. See, e.g., Letter from Jamie S. Miller, Vice President & Controller, Gen. Elec. Co., to




that four of the sixteen IASB seats be taken by North Americans13 ' is
not seen to assure an "appropriate" level of influence by U.S.
management.
D. U.S. Interests in an IFRS World
If the Roadmap in the end takes us to IFRS, what will the new
political equilibrium look like? The comment letters imply that the old
conflicts will again be acted out in the new global context.
To see why, compare the position taken by the auditing firms with
that of the managers. The auditing firms stress that mandated IFRS will
work only if U.S. interests, including the SEC, take a deferential posture
to the IASB. Under this view, opting in means accepting the IASB and
its governance structure as authoritative, even if U.S. interests find the
standards produced inappropriate. When the comment letters from
management express doubts about the magnitude of U.S. input at the
IASB, they, in effect, express doubts about the viability of IASB
authoritativeness. Even if IFRS, in its present form, is more congenial
to management as a general proposition, there is no guarantee of future
suitability. For all anyone knows, the IASB could in the long run
compound the problem management has had with the FASB-an
independent IASB could start establishing standards the managers
dislike without any U.S. actor being in a position to stop it. Now turn to
the users, who express concerns about authoritativeness from another
point of view. They worry that the IASB, as it goes forward in its
amorphous global governance position, will prove subject to the
influence of foreign governments and interest groups who lack a
commitment to decision usefulness.
Thus the Roadmap raises a political question concerning the
framework of relations between the SEC and the IASB. The U.S. could
take a deferential posture toward the IASB, as the audit firms are
suggesting, or it could follow the European Union and reserve a right to
endorse or veto new IFRS promulgations, standard-by-standard. The
former choice sacrifices accountability and potentially, national
economic interests, while the latter holds out a sacrifice of
comparability.
If the U.S. takes a standard-by-standard approach, the Roadmap, in
the end, delivers us to a revised domestic politics of standard setting. As
131. See TRUSTEES, INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM. FOUND., CHANGES IN THE
CONSTITUTION: REPORT OF THE IASC FOUNDATION TRUSTEES ON PART I OF THEIR REVIEW 5 (2009),
available at http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/573E48C3-52 IC-449E-985F-9A713 1CDAC17/0/
ConstitutionReviewPl May09.pdf.
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each new standard comes down the production line, the SEC either
backs IFRS and lives with dissent at political cost or resolves the
conflict by opting out of the IFRS treatment and promulgating its own
standard with a consequent sacrifice of comparability and increase in
compliance costs.
A posture of deference avoids these problems, but only in theory. In
practice, every time the IASB proves willing to go forward with a
standard over U.S. objections, whether articulated by management,
users, or the SEC, a domestic question concerning the national interest
in compliance will arise, with the question once again implicating a
trade off between the U.S. interest implicated and comparability. In
light of the contentious history of GAAP, it is fair to predict that the
comparability line inevitably will be crossed. Given this, one wonders
whether deference is politically tenable at the get go considering the
nebulous monitoring structure instituted by the IASCF. Deference
would put U.S. interests into the hands of a transnational standard-setter
whose independence is clouded by financial insecurity and whose public
accountability lies with a monitoring board on which the SEC holds only
one seat and whose powers are advisory only. Such a set-up will not sit
easy with U.S. issuers, users, or politicians.
In the end, all roads on the Roadmap lead to the same end point-a
reconstituted domestic politics of accounting standard setting.
Assuming that the SEC adopts IFRS in whole, how long will it then take
before domestic interests coalesce trumping a new IASB standard?
Whether this happens sooner or later, it will indeed happen, and when it
does the U.S. IFRS will begin a long, painful process of reverting to
U.S. GAAP. Given this projection, convergence emerges a relative
rather than an absolute proposition. So the policy question is this: What
is the most feasible degree of convergence? This, in turn, suggests that
we would be better off sticking with the FASB and the painstaking
GAAP-IFRS convergence process.
CONCLUSION
The SEC announced the Roadmap's pending appearance in August
2008, only to delay its release until November 2008. The financial
system collapsed between the two dates, with negative implications for
globalization imperatives. Matters, such as loss of listing business to
foreign markets and issuer comparability in global markets, loom less
large when securities issuers and regulators have more pressing
economic problems. Issuer comment letters expressing cost concerns




Out-of-pocket costs are not the only factor weighing in GAAP's
favor. The SEC that produced the Roadmap made the classic mistake of
a regulator grappling with business lost due to jurisdictional
competition. The earlier global domination of U.S. equity markets gave
the U.S. the privilege of imposing its own terms on foreign entities.13 2
Unfortunately, the U.S. can no longer do this. A choice is posed-
should the U.S. continue to go its own regulatory way or instead
reconstitute its markets so as to catch the at-the-margin consumers now
listing securities elsewhere? It is important that the regulator addressing
the choice avoids panic' 33 and takes a capacious view of the costs and
benefits. The past cannot be recaptured; something has to be sacrificed.
The regulator also needs to remember that the presence of regulatory
competition in the fact pattern does not, by itself, imply a policy result.
Competition in a global securities market does not have the same
economic properties as competition in a market for widgets. Regulation
markets are complicated places where costs and benefits do not
automatically signal catering to the marginal consumer. Protecting
domestic markets must be weighed against global market share and
reduction of global market frictions.
The SEC, instead of facing the issues, suffered a global panic attack,
truncating its cost-benefit calculus to focus only on interests at the
global level. Its new "Work Plan" signals that the panic has passed but
without guaranteeing that the matter will be determined in a context free
of scare talk and false global policy imperatives.
Meanwhile, the IASB, emboldened by the Roadmap, is starting to
show its true colors. Two weeks before the SEC released its Work Plan,
the IASB's oversight board announced that it would "emphasise that
convergence is a strategy aimed at promoting and facilitating the
adoption of IFRS, but it is not an objective by itself." 34 In other words,
the IASB sees no reason to implement new standards to cater to
American tastes in financial reporting, tastes not shared among the
preparers on its present roster of constituents. Unfortunately for the
IASB, a report in the Financial Times read this as abandonment of the
convergence objective. There followed a quick retraction by Gerrit
132. See generally Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Market for Securities Law, 75
U. CIII. L. REV. 1435 (2009).
133. Cf William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 264-65 (1997)
(describing "scare talk" deployments of jurisdictional competition theory).
134. Rachel Sanderson, IASB Softens Stance on Convergence, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 15,
2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9ac0lcde-la36-1 ldf-b4ee-
00144feab49a.html?nclick check-I.
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Zalm, the Chairman of the Trustees of the IASC Foundation,'35 but the
take-it-or-leave-it point had been made. The SEC's subsequent release
of the Work Plan, with its emphasis on further cooperation by the IASB,
lobs the ball back over the net. The game's outcome is anybody's guess
at this point.
The damage done by the Roadmap is there for all to see. The SEC
withdrew its support for the FASB-IASB convergence process. Now it
confronts persuasive reassertions of desirability of the convergence
process in its own comment file even as the IASB, taking a cue from the
Roadmap, signals its disinterest in convergence. How is the SEC to
retrace its steps at this point?
A convergence process, by definition, entails adjustments on both
sides. That means bargaining, a process undercut when the Roadmap
pulled the trumps from the national hand. It is not too late to restore
them: the SEC should veer off the Roadmap and return to its base in
GAAP. That accomplished, the FASB and the IASB can return to the
table to work toward a feasible degree of convergence.
135. See Press Release, Int'l Fin. Reporting Standards, Trustees Clarify Position on IFRS
Adoption Objective and Support for Convergence (Feb. 16, 2010), available at http://www.iasb.org/
News/Announcements+and+Speeches/Trusteesconvergencesupport.htm.
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